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556 PI.;ol'r,E V. MARTINEZ [38 C.2d 
lC'rim. ~o. r,276. In Blink. Mar. 7, 1952.J 
TIm PEOPIJE, Respondent, v. AURELIO MARTINEZ, 
Appellant. 
[1] Homicide-Murder-First Degree-Deliberation and Premed-
itation.-A homieide is murder of the first degree when the 
ilCCUSl'tl, as the result of deliberation and premeditation, in-
tended to take unlawfully the life of another. (Pen. Code, 
§ 189.) 
[2] ld. - Evidence - Deliberation and Premeditation. - Evidence 
supports conviction of first degree murder of defendant's 
wife on theory that murder was willful, deliberate and premed-
itated where defendant had long had difficulties with his 
wife, announced that some day he would "do something bad" 
to her, threatened and cut her with a deadly weapon on the 
night before the homicide, remained home from work on the 
day of the killing brooding over his troubles, and then, on 
discovering that she had filed a complaint against him, picked 
up Rn empty can, filled it with gasoline, proceeded directly 
to her housE', pursued her despite her frantic efforts to es-
eapc, covered her with gasoline, struck a second match after 
the first failed to ignite and set her on fire, failed to aid 
in rescue attempts, Rnd hindered those attempts by discon-
necting the hose. 
[3) ld.-Murder-First Degree-Killing by Torture.-Murder is 
perpetrated by means of torture when the assailant's intent 
is to cause cruel suffering on the part of the object of the 
attack, either for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persua-
sion, or to satisfy some other untoward propensity. 
[4] Id.-Evidence-Killing by Torture.-Evidence supports con-
viction of first degree murder of defendant's wife on theory 
that murder was perpetrated by means of torture where de-
fendant had previously stated that he intended to "do some-
thing bad" to his wife, and where the jury could reasonably 
('onclude that, when he set about to burn her with gasoline, 
his intention was to inflict cruel suffering as punishment or 
rl'YC'nge on his victim. 
[11 Sl'e Ca1.Jur., Homicide, § 14; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 14. 
[21 HI'\! Cal.Jur., Homicide, § 13; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 15. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Homicide, § 15(2); [2] Homicide, 
~ LiS; [3] Homicide, § 15; [4] Homicide, § 157; [5] Criminal 
Law. ~.'J61; [6J Criminal Law, §554j [7] Criminal Law, §329j 
[8] Criminal Law, § 264. 
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[5a,5b] Criminal Law-Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Examina-
tion of Experts.--Tt. is pl'O}Wf not to allow defendnnt's couns!'1 
to alSk nn expert witrlt"ss for the prosecution in a homicide 
cnse whether a person with a 2.35 alcohol content could "func-
tion not'lllally," where the question is directed only to the ef-
fect of inbxication, and where a negative answer, favorable 
to the nccuiied, would not be directed to the specific issue be-
fore the jury whether defendant had the capacity to form the 
specific intent essential to first degree murder; the question 
should be rephrased so as to ask the witness whether a man 
with such alcoholic content could understand the actions he 
contemplated would culminate in the wrongful death of an-
other human being. 
[6) Id.-Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Opinions of Experts.-An 
exp('rt may be asked a question which coincides with the ulti-
mate issue in the case. 
[7] Id.-Conduct of Judge.-Since a trial court has the duty to 
illlStruct the jury on questions of law at the end of the case, 
it can call counsel's attention to a rule of law in the presence 
of the jury, when the rule is not being followed. 
[8] Id.-Course and Conduct of 'l'rial.-The object of a trial is to 
ascertain the facts and apply thereto the appropriate rules 
of law in order that justice within the law shall be truly 
admini8tered; it is not only the right but the duty of a trial 
judge so to supervise and regulate the course of a trial that 
the truth shall be revealed insofar as it may be, within the 
established rules of evidence. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239) 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County, 
and from an order denying a new trial. Frederick E. Stone, 
Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction impos-
ing death penalty affirmed. 
Robert H. Haden, Public Defender, and Ben Curry, Jr., 
for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Dan Kauf-
mann, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J .-Defendant Aurelio Martinez was charged 
by information with the murder of his wife, Hope Martinez. 
lIe pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. 
[6J Testimony of expert witness as to ultimate fact, note, 78 
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A jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder of the ,first 
degree without recommendation and found that defendant 
was sane at the time of commission of the offense. De-
fendant's motion for a new trial was denied and he was 
sentenced to death. The appeal to this court is automatic. 
(Pen. Code, § 1239.) 
Defendant was 37 years old at the time of the homicide. 
He and his wife Hope had seven children. During the marriage 
he had many quarrels with Hope, and with her mother and 
stepfather with whom they resided in Tulare. Defendant 
threatened Hope, cursed her, and, on at least one occasion, 
beat her. On May 2, 1951, after a long argument with 
Hope and her mother, defendant moved out of the house. 
His mother-in-law had him arrested about this time but the 
judge released him after warning him to stay away from 
the house where Hope lived. 
Thereafter, until the time of the killing, defendant lived 
alone in a house owned by his brother. He gave Hope about 
$40 a week from his earnings to support herself and the 
children and kept about $20 for himself. Hope made a luneh 
for him each day to take to work and did his laundry. About 
two weeks before the homicide defendant told a friend that 
some day "he was going to do something bad" to her. 
On August 2, 1951, defendant and Hope quarreled again. 
He had come home from work and had no eigarettes or 
money. He asked Hope, who was on her way to the grocery 
store, to buy him a package of cigarettes. She refused, say-
ing that she needed the money for milk for the baby and 
for doctor's bills. Defendant felt aggrieved that out of the 
$40 he had given her that week she refused to give him 15 
cents for cigarettes. In the ensuing argument Hope said 
that she would no longer make defendant's lunch. A woman 
at the store said that "now somebody is going to see who is 
going to be the boss." It irritated defendant that three 
or four of defendant's friends overheard this remark. He 
cursed his wife and left. Later that day he borrowed money 
from a friend and bought a fifth of a gallon of wine. He 
returned to his room and drank the wine. He arose during 
the night, obtained a butcher knife and went to Hope's 
house with the intention, he testified, of "scaring" her. When 
he entered her bedroom, she screamed and aroused the house. 
In the excitement her hand was cut by the knife and de-
fendant ran out of the house. 
The next morning defendant walked over to Hope's house 
) 
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and found that she had not left any lunch for him on the 
porch. He told the driver of the car who stopped by to 
take him to work, that he was staying home that day because 
he had" a little family trouble." He idled about town dur-
ing the morning. He telephoned Hope, but she told him 
that she did not ,vant bim to bother her and hung up. De-
f£'ndant drank two or three bottles of beer and bought a fifth 
of a gallon of wine. He returned to his room, lay in bed, 
and drank nearly all the wine. 
Later in the day defendant's niece and another young girl 
looked in the bedroom window at defendant. He became 
enraged and rushed out to argue with the girls' parents. 
During this argument defendant was informed that the 
police were looking for him, since Hope had signed a com-
plaint against him because of the knife incident. Defendant 
subsequently told an investigator that at that moment he 
made up his mind to "destroy" Hope. 
Defendant left his room for the Montellano Store, a few 
blocks away. En route he picked up an empty lard can. 
When he approached the store he saw his sister-in-law Molly 
enter and followed her into the store. It was Molly's in-
tention to call Hope to warn her to avoid defendant. Upon 
discovering that he was following her, she became frightened 
and IE-ft without calling Hope. After Molly left, defendant 
also left and went to the Morales Grocery Store. At the 
pump in front of the store he purchased enough gasoline 
to fill the lard can. He then walked over to Hope's house, 
carrying the can of gasoline, a small box of matches, and 
a stick. 
When he entered the back door, his sister-in-law Jessie 
was calling the police because she had heard that defendant 
was coming for Hope. The occupants of the house were thrown 
into a panic. Hope ran out the front door as he came run-
ning through the kitchen. He followed her through the 
house, knocking Jessie down and spilling gasoline on a young 
girl who was in his ,yay. He shouted in Spanish, "Hope, 
don't run, because any way I am going to destroy you." 
As Hope ran through the yard she stumbled over some cor-
rugated metal and fell. Defendant was beside her in a 
moment and threw the gasoline over her. A woman neigh-
bor who had come to the scene on hearing Hope's screams 
shouted twice, "Don't burn her up." Defendant ignored 
her. He struck one match, which failed to ignite. He lit 
a second match and threw it on Hope's gasoline-drenched 
) 
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hod~·. She caught on fire and at the sanie time the gasoline 
remaiuing in the can ignited,apd defendant's clothes caught 
on fire. The neighbor who had attempted to stop defendant 
was slightly burned. 
A witness who had been attracted by Hope's screams and 
was watching the scene in horror snatched a blanket from 
his (·ar. and threw it over Hope as she arose and started 
to rlln in flames. With the aid of other witnesses, the flames 
W('l'\' extinguished with the blanket and dirt. Meanwhile, an-
other passerby dragged a hose from a nearby house towards 
Hope. Defendant ran to the faucet, disconnected the hose, 
Ilnd got under the faucet to put out the fire on his own 
dothes. He made no effort to give Hope assistance. When 
the police arrived, Hope's relatives w~re beating defendant 
with sticks. 
Hope was rushed to a hospital. Between 70 and 80 per cent 
of her body was covered with second and third degree burns. 
She died three days later. The doctor in attendance testi-
fied that the burns were the direct cause of her death. 
)[any witnesses testified to these events. Defendant tes-
tified in his own behalf and agreed in all material matters 
with the witnesses for the prosecution. When questioned 
on cross-examination concerning his state of mind preced-
ing the slaying, defendant stated that when he purchased 
the gasoline, "·Well, I guess I just went up to see if I could 
burn myself and burn her too. But I don't know just-my 
mind was-I was just out of my mind." During his testi-
1ll()1I~' deff'ndant recalled all the events during the pursuit 
of his victim, the throwing Qf the gasoline, the striking 
uf the two matches, and the burning of Hope and himself. 
lIis ability to remember details is significant in view of the 
contention that he was too drunk to premeditate the killing. 
The first question presented is whether the evidence is 
sufficient to support a conviction of murder in the first de-
grf'f'. The instructions authorized the jury to return a 
yerdict of first d<>gree murder on one or both of two the-
ories: the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated, 
or it was perp!'trated by means of torture.1 There is sub-
stantial eyidcnee to support both theories. 
[1] A homicidc is murder of the first degree when the 
accused, as the result of deliberation and premeditation, in-
1 Penal Code, section 189, provides: "All murder whieh is perpetrated 
by IIII'nn9 of . . . torture . . . or by any other kind of willful. delib-
erate. and premeditated killing ••• is nlUrder of the first degree." 
) 
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tended to take unlawfully the life of another. (Pen. Code, 
§ 189; People v. Bender, 27 Ca1.2d 164, 178 [163 P.2d 8].) 
[2] There is ample evidence of deliberation and premedi-
tation here. Defendant had long had difficulties with his 
wife. He announced that some day he would "do some-
thing bad" to her. On the night before the homicide he 
threntenrd her with a deadly weapon. On the day of the 
killing he remained home from work brooding over his 
troubles. His acts following his discovery that his wife 
had signed a complaint against him show a fixed intent 
to kill her. His picking up the empty can, maneuvering 
to prevent his sister-in-law from warning his wife, filling 
the can with gasoline, proceeding directly to his victim's 
house, pursuing her despite her frantic efforts to escape, 
covering her with gasoline, striking a second match after 
the first failed to ignite, and his failing to aid in rescue at-
tempts and actively hindering those attempts by disconnect· 
ing the hose, were all acts of deliberation that the jury could 
reasonably conclude were done pursuant to a premeditated 
plan to kill his wife. . 
[3, 4] The evidence also supports the theory that the mur· 
del' was perpetrated by means of torture. Murder is so per-
petrated when "the assailant's intent was to cause cruel 
suffering on the part of the object of the attack, either for 
the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or to satisfy 
some other untoward propensity." (People v. Tubby, 34 
Ca1.2d 72, 77 [207 P.2d 51]; People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d 
1G4. 177 [163 P.2d 8],) In the present case defendant had 
previously stated that he intended to "do something bad" 
to his wife. The jury could reasonably conclude that when 
defendant set about to burn his wife with gasoline, his in-
tention was to inflic~ cruel suffering as punishment or reo 
vrnge on his victim. 
. The principal contention presented by defendant concerns 
the trial court's rulings on questions asked by defendant on 
cross-examina tion. 
After the defendant was taken to the hospital for treat· 
ment of his bnrns, a blood sample was taken by the doctor 
in attendance. Dr. Eckleson, and given a laboratory analysis. 
The analysis showed that at about 8 p. m., when the sample 
was taken, the nlcohol content of defendant's blood was about 
1.9 milligrallls per cubic centimeter. Dr. Neal, director of 
a laboratory in Visalia, who regularly examined intoxicated 
persons for the shrriff's offil't' nnd the Cnlifornia Highway 
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Patrol, testified that the average alcohol destruction in a 
person is approximately 10 per cent per hour, which would 
make the alcohol content in defendant's blood at the time of 
the killing, about 6 :30 p. m., approximately 2.3 or 2.35 milli-
grams per cubic centimeter. 
Dr. Eckleson, called as a witness for the defendant, thought 
that the average person was "drunk" with about 1.5 alcohol 
content in his blood. On cross-examination he stated that 
the influence of alcohol on mental and physical faculties dif-
fered greatly from one person to another. When asked by 
the prosecution to apply his theories to the facts of this case, 
Dr. Eckleson replied that he thought that a person with 
the alcohol in his blood that defendant had would be able 
to buy gasoline, pursue another person and drench her with 
the gasoline, and light the gasoline, but would still be so 
drunk that he wouldn't "know what he was doing." 
In rebuttal the prosecution called Dr. Neal, who had not 
personally examined defendant or the blood specimen. He 
testified that a person with 1.9 alcohol content would under-
stand the consequences of his actions and, on cross-examina-
tion, that a person with 2.35 alcohol content could tell right 
from wrong. 
Counsel for defendant asked Dr. Nealon cross-examination 
if the mind of a person with a 2.35 alcohol content could 
"function normally." The court, in the presence of the 
jury, discussed the problem at some length and refused to 
allow the question to be asked.2 After the jury was excused, 
·"Haden [counsel for defendant]: And at 2.3 or 2.35, Doctor, his 
mental ability would be considerably impaired, I take it! 
"Dr. Neal: His mental ability would be further impaired, but it is 
my opinion that his judgment would not be so impaired that he could 
not tell right from wrong. 
"Haden: That isn't the proposition here, Doctor. This isn't a mat-
ter of sanity. This is a matter of whether or not his mind could func-
tion normally. Do you feel his mind could function normally' 
"The Court: That isn't the question. That is misstating the proposi-
tion. The question is whether his mind would be so affected by the 
alcohol that he couldn't form the intent to commit the act. If the--
the jury will have to determine whether or not because of the alcohol 
he is alleged to have consumed he would be incapable to form the in· 
tent to commit torture. That is one thing. And also whether he would 
be able to premeditate, to commit the murder with premeditation. And 
the question is not whether he was sane or insane, not whether his mind 
functioned properly, but whether his mind under those conditions was 
lIuch that he could form the intent to commit either of those two acts. 
"Haden: Your Honor, I wonder if you would ask that the jury be 
excused, please." 
) 
Mar. 1952] PEOPLE tI. MARTINEZ 
[38 C.2d 556; 241 P .2d 224] 
563 
the issue was argued by counsel. The court again refused 
to allow the question and stated that the inquiry must be 
directed to defendant's ability to form an intent to commit 
torture or murder. Counsel for defendant did not show any 
inclination to pursue the issue of sanity and refused to fol-
low the line of questioning indicated by the court. The wit-
ness was excused. 
[50.] The court's ruling presents the question whether coun-
sel should have been allowed to ask if defendant's mind 
"functioned normally." In PeopZe v. WeUs, 33 Cal.2d 330, 
350 [202 P.2d 53], a majority of this court stated: "It thus 
appears that on the trial in its first stage, mental capacity 
to commit the crime, insofar as sanity, but sanity only, is 
concerned, is conclusively presumed but that the specifie 
mental state (intent or motive) necessary to be proved as 
a fact in order to establish guilt of the particular crime is 
not presumed, either conclusively or otherwise. Whenever 
a particular mental state, such as a specific intent, is by 
statute made an essential element of a crime, that specific 
state must be proved like any other fact." (Accord, PeopZe 
v. Letourneau, 34 Cal.2d 478, 487 [211 P.2d 865]; People 
v. Danielly, 33 Cal.2d 362, 379 [202 P.2d 18].) It is con-
tended that under the views expressed in the foregoing cases 
the court's ruling was erroneous. We have reviewed this 
contention with. care because given defendant's admission 
that he committed the homicide, his only defense of any sub-
stance is that he did not have the capacity, by reason of 
intoxication or otherwise, to form the intent necessary for 
first degree murder. The disallowed question was not di-
rected to this defense. Dr. Neal testified as an expert on 
the effect of alcohol on a person's mental and physical capac-
ities. The question whether a person with a 2.35 alcohol 
content could "function normally" was directed only to the 
effect of intoxication in the obvious hope that the witness' 
would answer in the negative. But a negative answer, favor-
able to the accused, would not be directed to the issues of 
the trial. The question before the jury was whether defend-
ant had the capacity to form the specific intent essential 
to first degree murder. A person with the alcohol in his 
blood defendant had, will not ordinarily "function nor-
mally" but it does not follow that he could not commit 
first degree murder. As defense counsel undoubtedly realized, 
the jury would not necessarily take this distinction into con-
sideration. . Faced with a h9stile witness, counsel under-
;)64 PE()l'I,I~ U. 11AI~Tl:><EZ [38 C.2d 
f;tandably wished to protect his client's interests by asking 
his f[UI'stions in a gel1l'ral rather than a specific manner. 
Thp \·i(·(' of tIlt' ql1('stion is that it was designed to eluci-
date all answer that could be misinterpreted by the jury. 
This case is not one in which the trial court foreclosed 
inquiry into the mental condition of the defendant. The 
court at all times expressed willingness to allow counsel to 
pursue the matter further if he would rephrase his question. 
Under these circumstances its refusal to allow the question 
as presented by counsel was not error. 
Defendant points out that in ruling that the question 
must be rephrased, the court limited the inquiry to de-
fendant's capacity to form the specific intent essential to 
first degree murder. He then contends that the suggested 
line of approach was improper, on the theory that an ex-
pert witness could not express an opinion on the state of de-
f('ndant's mind. [6] Defendant's argument is based on the 
erroneous assumption that an .expert cannot be asked a ques-
tion that coincides with the ultimate issue in the case. (Peo-
ple v. Wilson, 25 Ca1.2d 341, 349 [153 P.2d 720] ; State v. 
Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 184 [185 P.2d 757] ; 7 Wigmore, Evi-
dence [3d I'd.], § 1921; see cases collected in 78 A.L.R. 755; 
20 Am.Jur., 653.) [5b] Counsel could properly have asked 
Dr. Neal whether a man whose blood had a 2.35 alcohol con-
tent could understand that the actions he contemplated would 
culminate in the wrongful death of another human being. 
Defendant also attacks the ruling of the trial court on 
the ground that the discussion in the presence of the jury 
was prejudicial. .At the request of defendant's counsel the 
jury was instructed to disregard the statements of the court, 
and he assured the court that the admonition cured any error. 
[7] In any event, since a trial court has the duty to instruct 
the jury on questions of law at the end of the case, it can 
call counsel's attention to a rule of law in the presence of 
the jury, when the rule is not being followed. (People v. 
Vukich, 201 Cal. 290, 298 [257 P. 46].) [8] "The object of a 
trial is to ascertain the facts and apply thereto the appropri-
ate rules of law, in order that justice within the law shall 
be truly administered. It is not only the right but the duty 
of a trial judge to so supervise and regulate the course of a 
trial that the truth shall be revealed in so far as it may be, 
within the established rules of evidence." (People v. Mendez, 
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721 [56 P.2d 193J; 3 Wigmore, Evidence [3d ed.], § 784.} 
The .indgment and the order denying the motion for a 
IH'W trial are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., 
and Spence, J., concurred. 
[Crim. No. 5250. In Bank. Mar. 11, 1952.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JULIO T. APARICIO, 
Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity.-
The sanity' contemplated by Pen. Code, § 1368, relating to 
the determination of the sanity of defendant when doubt 
thereof arises prior to judgment, is tested by appraising 
defendant's present ability so to understand the nature and 
purpose of the proceedings taken against him as to be able 
to conduct his own defense in a rational manner. 
[2] Id.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Doubt of 
Sanity as Basis for Trial.-A strong sho,ving is required be-
fore an abuse of discretion is deemed to result from the trial 
court's failure to order a determination of present sanity; 
the "doubt" as to defendant's sanity, requiring a trial of such 
issue under Pen. Code, § 1368, is one that must arise in the 
mind of the trial judge, rather than in the mind of de-
fendant's counselor in that of any third person. 
[3] Id.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Doubt of 
Sanity as Basis for TriaI.-Testimony of experts as to in-
sanity in a general sense is not sufficient to create a doubt 
as to defendant's sanity, requiring a trial of such issue 
under Pen. Code, § 1368, insofar as that testimony does not 
relate to defendant's ability to condu~t his own defense. 
[4] Id.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity-Discretion of 
Court.-When a doubt of dcfendant's sanity at the time of 
trial as contemplated by Pen. Code, § 1368, appears on the 
face of t.he record as a matter of law, an abuse of discretion 
[1] Test of present insanity which will prevent trial for crime 
or punishlllcnt after conviction, note, 3 A.L.R. 94. See, also, Cal 
Jur., Criminal Law, § 270. 
McK. Dig. References: [11 Criminal Law, § 236(1); [2,3] Crimi-
nal Law, § 236(2) j [4,6] Criminal Law, § 236(5); [5J Criminal 
Law, §236. 
